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abstract 
In the early 1960s, a number of anarchist writers showed an interest in cybernetics, in 
which they saw the tools for better articulating radical forms of self-organisation. 
Discussions on the connections between anarchism and cybernetics did not advance very 
far, however, and by the 1970s the topic seems to have fallen off the anarchist radar. With 
an increase in interest in cybernetics over the last few years, this paper picks up where 
these debates left off and highlights some key points of contact between cybernetics and 
anarchism that have the potential to advance radical accounts of self-organisation. Based 
on a theoretical appraisal of the core texts and arguments in the debate around anarchism 
and cybernetics, the paper shows that the way in which hierarchy is formulated in 
cybernetic thought has a crucial impact on anarchist theory and practice and aids both 
academic approaches to social movements and, importantly, anarchist and radical left 
praxis. In addition, it provides a response to the critique of cybernetics in critical 
management studies that stands as a barrier to taking cybernetics seriously as a 
contribution to radical understandings of organisation. 
Introduction 
In this paper, I attempt to rehabilitate cybernetics, in some form, as a tradition 
that has the potential to enrich our understandings of radical or alternative forms 
of organisation. In doing so, I argue for an anarchist cybernetics: a reading of 
Stafford Beer’s organisational cybernetics that lends itself to forms of 
organisation that aim to limit if not completely reject centralised, top-down 
command and control in favour of participatory and democratic practices.  
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Cybernetics has experienced something of a resurgence in recent years with a 
number of popular science books (Kline, 2015; Medina, 2011; Pickering, 2010) 
having been followed by a small but significant amount of interest in the subject 
within academia and beyond. While some of this work is highly critical (e.g., 
Tiqqun, 2001; Morozov, 2014), there are also more balanced engagements 
(Collister, 2014; Crnkić , 2013; Duda, 2013; Galloway, 2014). In critical 
management studies (CMS), cybernetics has not enjoyed much attention. In 
Organization, a leading journal in the field, discussions of cybernetics are few 
and far between (e.g., Baeker, 2006; Checkland, 1994; Galliers, Mingers and 
Jackson, 1997). In ephemera, cybernetics has received serious consideration in 
only one paper (Collister, 2014) and very brief mention in a number of others 
(e.g., de Geus, 2014; Hoofd, 2010). In addition to addressing this lacuna in CMS, 
this paper aims to contribute to the growing body of work in CMS on radical 
social movements (e.g. Feigenbaum et al., 2013; Kokkinidis, 2015; Parker et al., 
2007; Parker et al., 2014; Sutherland et al., 2014) as well as anarchist 
organisation more specifically (e.g. Land, 2007; Parker, 2011; Reedy, 2002; see 
also the recent ephemera special issue: ephemera, 2014). 
On the face of it, anarchism and cybernetics, as I characterise them here, might 
seem like opposites, at least in terms of their respective accounts of organisation. 
Anarchists, on the one hand, have championed non-hierarchical and anti-
authoritarian forms of organisation that are built on liberation and autonomy. 
Cybernetics, on the other, in CMS and elsewhere, has been critiqued for being a 
functionalist and technocratic approach to organisation, offering the kind of 
blueprints and top-down planning that anarchists and other radicals frequently 
reject. Contrary to this apparent conflict, I suggest in this paper that a reappraisal 
of one particular strand of cybernetic thought – the strand most closely 
associated with UK-based cyberneticians, Stafford Beer chief among them – can 
in fact enrich an anarchist account of organisation. Through a theoretical 
appraisal of cybernetics, I aim to show that the ways in which Beer and others 
have thought about self-organisation, autonomy and hierarchy might provide the 
foundations for a nuanced descriptive and normative theory of how people can 
organise in ways that maximise collective and individual autonomy. In short, I 
want to answer the question, ‘What can cybernetics teach us about how 
anarchists can and do organise?’. In doing so, I intend to propose an ‘anarchist 
cybernetics’ as a new way of thinking about anarchist organisation. 
To this end, this paper will attempt three tasks. Firstly, I begin with overviews of 
both anarchism and Stafford Beer’s organisational cybernetics, focusing on his 
Viable System Model. Secondly, I turn to how cybernetics was taken up by 
several anarchists in the 1960s and 1970s. Thirdly, in order to advance a 
theoretical development of this meeting of anarchist political theory and the 
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understanding of control and organisation found in cybernetics, I introduce and 
discuss the notion of functional hierarchy. In line with this third task, I then 
attempt to rearticulate Beer’s Viable System Model as a way of understanding 
anarchist organisation. Cybernetics, I argue, has the potential to add crucial 
nuance to anarchist accounts of organisation and, more generally, to show how 
social movement organisation can be understood in ways that go beyond often 
simplistic descriptions of ideal situations of democratic deliberation and decision 
making. In concluding, I respond to the functionalism critique of cybernetics. 
Anarchism 
Anarchism has often been associated with chaos and disorder, and so to take 
anarchism as the starting point for a discussion of organisation may to some 
seem odd. The depiction of the bomb-throwing anarchist assassin and 
provocateur left in the public imagination by works of literature such as Joseph 
Conrad’s The Secret Agent lingers to this day, and ‘anarchist’ is often used across 
the political spectrum to dismiss an opponent’s views and actions as nonsensical, 
immature and, worse yet, a dangerous threat to any and all forms of social 
organisation. The anarchist tradition, contrary to these dramatic caricatures, is 
fundamentally concerned with order and with effective organisation. One of the 
earliest proponents of anarchism as a political position, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
argued that ‘society finds its highest perfection in the union of order with 
anarchy’ (1840: n.p.). As Ruth Kinna puts it, ‘anarchism is a doctrine that aims at 
the liberation of peoples from political domination and economic exploitation by 
the encouragement of direct or non-governmental action’ (2005: 1). Anarchism 
shares with traditions such as socialism and communism the view that people 
should be free to enjoy the fruits of their labour without exploitation by capitalists 
and other land and property owners and that they should have the political 
freedom to associate in whatever ways they please and to explore individual 
autonomy to the greatest extent allowed by the need for collective organisation. 
This drive towards collective and individual liberation has seen anarchists over 
the last almost two centuries resist in various ways, among others, capitalism, the 
state, organised religion, monarchy, patriarchy, racism and colonialism, 
homophobia and, more recently, environmental destruction and exploitation of 
animals. 
As Kinna notes, however, one of the things that distinguishes many anarchists 
from others aligned with socialist and communist traditions is the commitment 
to direct, non-governmental political action in both enacting this resistance and 
prefiguring alternative forms of life. Direct action is often conflated with 
violence, and while many anarchists accept violence as a necessary tactic at 
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certain moments, direct action is certainly not reducible to it. Benjamin Franks 
writes that direct action ‘refers to practical prefigurative activity carried out by 
subjugated groups in order to lessen or vanquish their own oppression’ (2006: 
115; see also 2003). Direct action, crucially, involves not petitioning others in 
order to oppose oppression or exploitation, be those others actors such as 
governments or political parties or indeed the oppressors and exploiters 
themselves, but instead taking the steps deemed necessary to solve the problem 
directly.  
Closely tied to direct action is the notion of prefiguration, something only 
relatively recently coined but a core element of anarchist politics at least as far 
back as the nineteenth-century anarchist Mikhail Bakunin. Prefiguration as a 
central plank of direct action means that the means used in resisting oppression 
and exploitation should reflect and be constitutive of the ends desired 
(Maeckelbergh, 2009; van de Sande, 2013; Yates, 2014). For anarchists, then, real 
freedom cannot be issued by a dominating authority but can only be realised 
through direct action by those who free themselves. It is for these reasons that 
anarchism is often described as an anti-authoritarian political tradition 
committed to non-hierarchical organisation, in so far as hierarchies subjugated 
the many at the bottom of the typical organisational pyramid to the few at the top. 
One of the ways anarchism has been articulated most over the past two or three 
decades is through a focus on direct and participatory democratic decision 
making, often with reference to consensus decision making as a model that 
provides an alternative to both top-down authoritarian domination and the 
perceived limitations of representative forms of democracy (Maeckelbergh, 
2009; 2012; Seeds for Change, 2013). Important to this contemporary strand of 
anarchist thought is the notion of networked organisation. Franks (2006), for 
example, identifies the network or federation approach to organisation as one of 
those that is most in tune with the autonomy and self-organisation at the heart of 
the anarchist movement as it has developed in recent years (see also, e.g. Gordon, 
2008: 14-17; Graham, 2011; Ward, 1973: 51-52). 
Anarchism has received increasing interest among academics in recent years, 
largely as a result of its more central position in left-wing social movements 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gordon, 2008; Wilson, 2014). To cite 
just one relevant example, this very journal published a special issue on 
anarchism and critical management studies in 2014 (ephemera, 2014), which 
included authors from a range of fields including political theory, economics, 
philosophy, geography and media and communication studies as well as 
management and organisation studies. 
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Organisational cybernetics 
The word ‘cybernetics’ has its etymological origins in the Ancient Greek word 
κυβερνήτης  and refers to the art of steering or governing. In the period 
immediately following the Second World War, Norbert Wiener, credited as the 
father of cybernetics, defined it as ‘the scientific study of control and 
communication in the animal and the machine’ (1961 [1948]: 11). Wiener’s work 
in fact began during the war, working on automated anti-aircraft guns, but after 
the end of the war he declared himself an anti-militarist and refused funding for 
military-focused research (Wiener, 1947; see Mirowski, 2002 for an overview of 
the origins of cybernetics during the war). Cybernetics was intended as an 
interdisciplinary approach to how systems (organisms, machines, animals and, 
later, social forms of organisation) use feedback to self-organise and self-regulate 
(Mead, 1968). Here, I want to focus on one specific strand of cybernetics that 
developed out of the initial engagement with feedback, self-organisation and 
control in the 1940s. While cybernetics research shot off in myriad directions, 
eventually being eclipsed in the hard sciences by information theory (Kline, 
2015), the avenue I want to turn to here is the one that is perhaps most relevant 
when discussing organisation and, as I will show, radical and anarchist 
approaches to organisation.1 
Of importance here is the work of Stafford Beer (and more broadly the British 
tradition of cybernetics (Pickering, 2010)) and how he developed Wiener’s 
cybernetics into the realm of social organisation. Beer began his work with 
cybernetics as a management consultant after the Second World War and went 
on to work on a number of projects that took his account of cybernetics outside 
of the corporate realm in which it started. In the early 1960s he worked in 
Salvador Allende’s Chile on Project Cybersyn, the attempt by the socialist 
government to link production and distribution in the country using an 
electronic network (see Medina, 2011 for a full history of this episode). It was a 
system that, as many have suggested (e.g. Espejo, 2014), prefigured the internet 
in the way it aimed at laying down information pathways throughout the country 
that would allow for real-time coordination of the economy. Crucial to Beer’s 																																																								
1  The history of cybernetics is intricately interwoven with the history of the Cold War 
and many of the developments in the field emerged as a result of competition and 
suspicion between the US and the Soviet Union. Funding for cybernetics in the US 
after the initial burst of interest in the 1940s came as a direct result of Soviet 
investment in the field and fears of the Soviet Union overtaking the West in key areas 
of scientific development. Some of the financial support for cybernetics in the 1950s 
was even provided by the CIA and has been linked to the mind-control project 
MKUltra (Kline, 2015: 185-90; Umpleby, 2005). For more in-depth histories of 
cybernetics, see Hayles, 1999; Kline, 2015; Mirowski, 2002. On Soviet Cybernetics, 
see Dyer-Witheford, 2013 and Francis Spufford’s 2010 novel Red plenty. 
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cybernetics was the claim that there are certain core principles that can be 
applied in understanding the organisational dynamics of self-organising systems, 
regardless of what those systems are. This allowed him to take the practical 
application of cybernetics beyond electronics, mechanics and biology and into the 
realm of social organisation. 
For the strand of cybernetics I want to discuss here, organisation is understood 
as a set of lines of communication arranged in a network. Beer describes the 
organisation of a system in the following way: 
The connectiveness of the system can now be introduced into this picture by 
drawing lines between the dots […] In this way, we come to look upon a system as 
a kind of network. […] [t]he lines depicting the network of our system are in fact its 
communications. (1967: 10-11, italics in original) 
This is echoed, for instance, by John Duda, who writes of Wiener’s cybernetic 
programme that ‘the very definition of a system lies in the communicative links 
between its component parts’ (2012: 78). So when we think about organisation in 
the context of cybernetics, we are thinking about a network of nodes linked in 
multiple ways by lines of communication.2 Here we can see a foreshadowing of 
some of connections between anarchism and cybernetics explored in detail 
below: both are built upon a networked account of organisation. This is of course 
a very broad definition of organisation that can apply to any form of sociality and 
indeed to any form of system, from organic to mechanical, from electronic to 
social. While this apparent reductionism may seem like stepping onto 
uncomfortable territory, it is this that has allowed cyberneticians such as Beer to 
develop a holistic understanding of effective organisation. I do not intend to 
argue this point here, but for Beer and others, the insights gained from 
cybernetics apply to any and all forms of system or organisation. The subsequent 
discussion of cybernetics and the specific elements of Beer’s concept of effective 
organisation, therefore, should be seen as grounded in this general account of 
organisation as a network of nodes in communication with one another. 
There are three core concepts behind cybernetics that are most relevant when 
discussing organisational cybernetics and its relevance for anarchism: 
complexity, autonomy and control. As Wiener’s definition of cybernetics and the 
understanding of organisation at the centre of cybernetics suggests, 
communication is also a vitally important concept, but for the sake of space it is 
the control element that will occupy a more prominent position in this paper (on 
cybernetics and communication, see Swann and Husted, 2017). 																																																								
2  This of course brings cybernetics into a close relationship with systems theory (see 
e.g. Checkland, 1994). 
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Complexity is defined in line with the variety of possible states of a system3 and 
its environment4 and the changes that take place in this system-environment 
coupling. The foundational principle of cybernetics is that for a system (an 
organism, a machine, an organisation) to remain stable, the system has to be able 
to change its state to match changes in the environment. This is referred to as 
Ashby’s Law, after cybernetician Ross Ashby (1956), or the Law of Requisite 
Variety. Successful organisation, according to organisational cybernetics, is about 
using the information from feedback loops to alter behaviour so that the variety 
in the system matches the variety in the environment. Scholars of cybernetics 
Angela Espinosa, Roger Harnden and Jon Walker describe complexity as the 
process whereby ‘the internal dynamics of the organisation and the external 
niche change in a never-ending dance’ (2008: 640). Systems and organisations 
exist in complex worlds and must be flexible in responding to that complexity. 
The way they do so is by embracing autonomy. 
Autonomy is considered a necessary feature of any system in order that it can 
respond flexibly to changes. For Beer, a system or organisation that can do this 
can be described as ‘viable’: it can continue to pursue its goals while participating 
in this dance with complexity (Beer, 1994 [1981]: 50). An organisation which is 
run in a rigidly centralised manner would be too sluggish to be able to respond to 
change (ibid.,: 103; see also Leonard, 2013: 17). As Beer writes, 
[i]t is clear that large areas of any organisation will and should be autonomous. If 
every aspect of business, every smallest decision, had to be thought about 
consciously at the senior management level then obviously the firm would grind to 
a halt. (1967: 219-220) 
Allowing the parts to operate with some level of autonomy increases the potential 
variety in the organisation’s operations, making it easier for it to match the 
variety in the environment. The different parts of any system must, therefore, 
have some level of autonomy from the rest of the system and be able to respond 
to change as they see fit. 
While the context of much of Beer’s work on organisational cybernetics is in 
hierarchically-organised companies, the notion of control he utilises has little in 
common with accounts based on command and control structures, orders and 
top-down decision-making. Beer is keen to note, for example, that despite 
pyramidal organisational charts, organisations that remain stable, successfully 																																																								
3  In line with the definition of organisation relevant to cybernetics, Beer characterises 
systems as ‘anything that consists of parts connected together’ (1967: 9). 
4  Importantly, the distinction between a system and its environment in cybernetics is 
only from the perspective of a certain observer and is not objective (see Cilliers, 2001; 
Espinosa et al., 2008: 639-640). 
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cope with change and are able to pursue goals do so because their actual 
operations depart radically from their stated organisational structure. If an 
organisation were to follow the chain of command set out in its organisational 
chart – with a leadership at the top and various levels of authority and 
responsibility arranged downwards as far as those at the bottom who have no 
authority and are required to follow orders passed down the chain – the response 
to change at the bottom, where the organisation actually operates in its 
environment, would be incredibly slow. Those at the bottom would need to pass 
information about the change in the environment up to the next level and so on 
until the leadership at the top made a decision and passed that decision down 
again through each level. By that point, Beer argues, the response would be 
irrelevant as the situation would have changed again. In avoiding this, the parts 
of the organisation in contact with the environment in fact embody a degree of 
autonomy in so far as they can respond to change as they see fit within set limits. 
They need to be able to do this for the organisation to remain stable in the face of 
change (1967: 80-83).  
Control, on this understanding, is used as a technical notion that refers to the 
processes at work in systems that regulate the operations of those systems, 
through autonomous action. It is not about compulsion or being directed 
through domination. Control refers to the way in which the parts of an 
organisation operate autonomously in response to change. It is in this sense, 
then, that systems and organisations can be said to be self-organising: they 
control themselves through an arrangement between autonomous parts.  
Cybernetician Allenna Leonard puts it well: 
A cybernetic understanding is not that control that is backed up by coercion […] It 
is the control of a skier going down a hill, of balancing this way and that. Or it is 
the control of a helmsman steering a ship. The one thing that people do not realize 
about [cybernetics] is that the control is in each function, not top-down […] That 
makes cybernetics more of a science of balancing than a science of control. (2013: 
16-17)  
Similarly, Espinosa et al. write that organisational cybernetics 
helps us […] to create more effective organisation by engaging the energy and 
intelligence of local constituents in the overall endeavour. The experience of 
maximum local autonomy is […] one of the logical requirements for ensuring 
effective organisation. (2008: 642)  
In applying these insights to the practical task of organisation, Beer developed a 
particular model for understanding how organisation works according to 
cybernetics: the Viable System Model. 
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The Viable System Model 
The account of Beer’s Viable System Model (VSM) I present here is based 
primarily on how he describes the model in Brain of the firm (1994 [1981]).5 The 
VSM is divided into five levels or systems (see Figure 1 below). 
 
Figure 1: The Viable System Model, showing three System One units (A, B, C) and 
their interaction with their local niches and one another (1A, 1B, 1C), their 
coordination under System Two and the strategic alignment of the whole 
organisation or system at Systems Three, Four (in relation to the whole 
environment) and Five. The arrows represent flows of information between parts 
of the model. The dotted lines indicate the two broad sections of the model. (Based 
on Beer’s depiction of the VSM in Brain of the firm (1994 [1981]: 128).) 
																																																								
5  For supplementary accounts, see Beer, 1994 [1979], 1985, 1989; Espejo and 
Harnden, 1989; Espinosa et al., 2004; 2008; Leonard, 1994; Medina, 2011: 34-39; 
Pickering, 2010: 240-256; Walker, 2006. 
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System One 
The System One units of the model represent the operational parts of an 
organisation. The System One units operate on specific tasks within the external 
environment and have the autonomy to respond to changes in their 
environmental niches as they see fit. 
System Two 
The second level is a framework within which System One units communicate 
with one another and coordinate their activities. As Beer writes, System Two 
‘exists to provide a local interaction between Systems One of all of the 
subsidiaries’ (1994 [1981]: 165). This affords a minimal level of coordination 
between System One units but does not provide organisational goals. They ‘hunt 
about aimlessly’ (ibid.: 129) and as yet there is no purpose or overarching goal to 
their operation. 
System Three 
In addition to the five sub-systems, Beer divides the VSM into two broader 
sections. From the perspective of a System One unit, this works such that the 
first, lower part of the system or organisation ‘has to do with recognizing that 
there are other autonomous divisions than my own’ while the second, higher part 
of the system or organisation ‘has to do with recognizing that my own 
autonomous division is part of a corporation’ (ibid.: 229). System Three is the 
first level of that second or higher part of the VSM: it regulates the operations of 
System One units not in line with each other but in line with the goals of the 
system or organisation of which they are part. 
System Four 
The fourth level is where the immediate strategy of the system or organisation is 
developed. It involves those activities that take in information from System Three 
about how the lower, autonomous System One units are operating as well as 
information from the environment about changes and fluctuations and how the 
system or organisation responds to and affects these. In addition, it is involved in 
transmitting information between System Three and the planning and longer-
range strategic thinking and decision-making at System Five. 
System Five 
At the top of the VSM is System Five. This level Beer describes as the ‘senior 
management’: ‘The direction of the enterprise, with its concentration on where 
we are going rather than where we have come from, with its foresight that is to 
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say, is the thinking part of the whole organisation’ (ibid., 201). This is a rather 
unfair characterisation as every level of the system or organisation is thinking, 
but what Beer means is that looking at the system or organisation as a whole, 
System Five is the part that deals with the long-term planning for the system or 
organisation. 
While a lot more can be said about the VSM, including how it relates to the kind 
of actual organisations Beer was working with when he developed it, I must leave 
this discussion for another time. The important thing to grasp from this brief 
overview is the role the different sub-systems of the VSM play and how they 
relate to one another. This is of perhaps a level of abstraction many are 
uncomfortable with, but I will return to a concrete example of what this means in 
practice below.  
It should be noted that the way this operates as a model is different from the 
notion of a blueprint. Organisation theory in general and Critical Management 
Studies in particular has shown a scepticism towards blueprints as plans of how 
organisations ought to be structured, with these plans being applied from above. 
The VSM, however, is not intended to operate as a blueprint in this way. Beer 
described the VSM as a ‘diagnostic tool’ (1994 [1981]: 155) and cybernetician 
Roger Harnden has similarly discussed its use as a ‘hermeneutic enabler’ (1989). 
The point of the VSM is, therefore, not to prescribe organisational structures or 
practices but to provide the tools those involved in organising can use to better 
understand the processes in which they are participating. The VSM, rather than 
outlining the exact structure of a viable organisation is intended to highlight the 
necessary functions and lines of communication that any organisation, however 
it is in fact structured, will need to have. In this sense, it is intended as a heuristic 
of sorts that can assist people in thinking through and responding to questions of 
organisational structure rather than as a blueprint they ought to follow. 
Another point worth covering before moving on is the distinction between 
description and normativity in Beer’s VSM. Beer’s account of effective 
organisation is intended as a descriptive one, in which the functions and lines of 
communication are defined and made apparent. The normativity of any actually-
existing organisational form, according to Beer, comes not from a cybernetic 
understanding of the functionality of a viable system but from the operation of 
the organisation itself. Beer notes, for example, that the normative planning and 
goal-setting happens at sub-system five (1994 [1979]: 354). This is not something 
built into the VSM as a model but something mapped as a function that will 
occur in a real-world example of organisation. What the VSM does, through 
describing effective organisation, is allow those determining the normativity of a 
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particular organisation to assess where different functions should be located and 
how lines of communication should be developed. 
With these brief overviews, both of anarchism and Beer’s cybernetics and his 
VSM, in place, I want to now build on these descriptive openings in order to 
advance the argument that there is something about self-organisation that 
cybernetics can tell us that can enrich anarchist accounts of organisation. First, I 
want to cover the existing engagements with cybernetics by anarchist writers. 
Anarchism and cybernetics 
In 1963, the journal Anarchy published two papers discussing the relevance of 
cybernetics for anarchism.6 The first of these, by neurophysiologist Grey Walter 
(1963), focuses on human physiology and early robotics and only briefly touches 
on political organisation. Crucially, however, Walter notes (1963: 89) that 
examinations of how the brain is organised reveal that ‘we find no boss in the 
brain, no oligarchic ganglion or glandular Big Brother.’ He goes on to say: 
Within our heads, our lives depend on equality of opportunity, on specialisation 
with versatility, on free communication and just restraint, a freedom without 
interference. Here too local minorities can and do control their own means of 
production and expression in free and equal intercourse with their neighbours. If 
we must identify biological and political systems our own brains would seem to 
illustrate the capacity and limitations of an anarcho-syndicalist community. 
(Walter, 1963: 89) 
This is an instructive passage that is strikingly similar and equally evocative to 
one from Beer on the form of control at work in cybernetics: 
There is no ultimate ganglion in the brain that tells the nervous system what to do. 
There is no thermostat anywhere in the body with a marker set at the temperature 
98.4˚ F. And the Book of Proverbs reminds us that ‘the locusts have no king, and yet 
they go about in bands’. In short, democratic systems regulate and organise 
themselves without benefit of dictat or ukase. They do not have hierarchies of 
command. (2009 [1975]: 25) 
																																																								
6  While there has been some minimal discussion of anarchism and decentralised 
organisation in the literature on and connected to cybernetics e.g. that of Angela 
Espinosa et al. (2008), Maurice Yolles (2003), Ana Paula Baltazar (2007) and, to a 
limited extent, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980), this work does not 
identify or elaborate on the connections between cybernetics and anarchism that I 
want to discuss here. 
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While neither Beer not Walter were anarchists per se,7 they both show leanings 
towards anarchist accounts of self-organisation that draw on the central tenets of 
cybernetics. The second Anarchy paper, written by John D. McEwan (1987 
[1963]), goes into greater depth on the relationship between cybernetics and 
anarchism and is far more explicit in this regard. The starting point for 
understanding the connection between anarchism and cybernetics is the concept 
of self-organisation: 
The basic premise of the governmentalist – namely, that any society must 
incorporate some mechanism for overall control – is certainly true, if we use 
‘control’ in the sense of ‘maintain a large number of critical variables within limits 
of toleration’. […] The error of the governmentalist is to think that ‘incorporate 
some mechanism for control’ is always equivalent to ‘include a fixed isolatable 
control unit to which the rest, i.e. the majority, of the system is subservient’. This 
may be an adequate interpretation in the case of a model railway system, but not 
for a human society. The alternative model is complex, and changing in its search 
for stability in the face of unpredictable disturbances. (ibid.: 57) 
Crucially, McEwan addresses self-organisation in much the same way as it was 
utilised in the work of Beer. Crucial to this is how the technical notion of control 
as self-organisation links up with the political notion of self-organisation. As 
John Duda puts it, moving the notion from the technical understanding of early 
cyberneticians to the social or political notion used by Beer, self-organisation can 
be understood ‘as radical democracy and horizontal self-determination’ (2013: 
57). McEwan compares his account of cybernetic social self-organisation to a 
passage from anarchist Peter Kropotkin that speaks of an anarchist society 
‘which looks for harmony in an ever-changing and fugitive equilibrium between 
a multitude of varied forces’ (quoted in McEwan, 1987 [1963]: 52). Cybernetics 
and an anarchist vision of society both recognise the complexity and variety that 
is central to organisations and their environments. Furthermore, both focus on 
the importance of a constantly shifting harmony achieved through autonomous 
self-organisation. As Kinna writes of cybernetics (2005: 68), ‘[i]n contrast to 
government control mechanisms, self-organizing systems were controlled from 
within the organism and could respond to their ever-changing diversity.’  
This initial affinity between anarchism and organisational cybernetics is made all 
the stronger when one takes a closer look at how Kropotkin characterises 
centralised, top-down forms of government as being not only politically and 																																																								
7  Walter did come from an anarchist family that included his father Karl who attended 
the Anarchist Congress in Amsterdam in 1907, his son Nicholas who was a leading 
figure in the anarchist movement in the UK in the 1960s and his granddaughter 
Natasha who is a prominent feminist writer and activist. Involvement in radical 
politics seems to have skipped a generation when it came to Grey Walter, although 
the passage quoted shows that he certainly retained some anarchist sympathies. 
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morally objectionable but also ineffectual in dealing with complexity and variety: 
‘in all production there arise daily thousands of difficulties which no government 
can solve or foresee’ (1927: 76-77). Kropotkin argues that ‘production and 
exchange represented an undertaking so complicated that the plans of the state 
socialists, which lead inevitably to a party directorship, would prove to be 
absolutely ineffective as soon as they were applied to life.’ As an alternative to 
centralised attempts at responding to variety, Kropotkin proposes that the 
workers themselves administer production in an autonomous manner. Political 
scientist Marius de Geus, who has also highlighted the parallels between 
Kropotkin’s anarchism and what he refers to as ‘bio-cybernetics’, writes:  
[Kropotkin’s] vision of an anarchist society strongly resembles relatively modern 
bio-cybernetic organizational theories and systems of ‘self-regulating’ modules. In 
society there exist basic units (individuals, associations, communes, etc.) which 
have to possess autonomy, and which can co-operate and federate on a voluntary 
basis with the other units. (2014: 869) 
Colin Ward, one of the foremost anarchist writers in the latter half of the 
twentieth century and editor of Anarchy, notes (1966: n.p.) that ‘[c]ybernetic 
theory with its emphasis on self-organising systems, and speculation about the 
ultimate social effects of automation, leads in a similar revolutionary direction’ as 
anarchism. Ward argues that anarchists as early as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
understood that complexity is central to autonomy (1974: 44). Indeed, Ward 
writes that  
[h]armony results not from unity but from complexity […] Anarchy is a function, 
not of society’s simplicity and lack of social organisation, but of its complexity and 
multiplicity of social organisations.8 (ibid.: 50) 
He goes on to claim that ‘[c]ybernetics, the science of control and communication 
systems, throws valuable light on the anarchist conception of complex self-
organising systems’ (ibid.). 
Unfortunately, this seems to be about as far as the connection between 
organisational cybernetics and anarchism went.9 Based primarily on Beer’s work 
it may well be possible to pick up where Ward, McEwan and others left off and 
show how cybernetics can play a role in an understanding of anarchist 
organisation. Doing so, I want to argue, will address key gaps in the literature on 																																																								
8  Echoing this, Murray Bookchin, while not drawing on cybernetics, writes of 
ecological stability that it ‘is a function not of simplicity and homogeneity but of 
complexity and variety’ (1982: 24). Bookchin uses the term ‘cybernetics’ but does so 
to refer to high-technology rather than processes of self-organisation (1985). 
9  See Duda (2013) for a discussion of two other brief and minimal engagements with 
cybernetics by anarchist writers Paul Goodman and Sam Dolgoff. 
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both anarchism and, in turn, Beer’s cybernetics. On anarchism, there needs to be 
more of an attempt at articulating the detailed dynamics of anarchist 
organisational forms. On cybernetics, more can be done to elaborate on the 
radical implications of Beer’s work. In responding to the research question set 
out in the introduction to this paper (‘What can cybernetics teach us about how 
anarchists can and do organise?’), I focus below on the third task of this paper, 
on how Beer’s strand of cybernetics leads us to rethink how anarchists might 
frame hierarchy in organising and what an anarchism VSM might look like. 
Through examining these two areas in detail, I hope to be able to begin to explore 
precisely how engaging with cybernetics from an anarchist perspective might be 
fruitful and what might be gained in doing so. 
Functional hierarchy 
What seems to be holding back a productive relationship between anarchism and 
organisational cybernetics is the hierarchy involved in Beer’s VSM. While System 
One operating units do enjoy a level of autonomous decision-making, and indeed 
this is essential to responding to complexity, any decisions must be made within 
the parameters set by Systems Three-Five where the planning and regulation of 
the whole organisation is of concern. The VSM remains, in how it is presented, a 
centralised affair, even if that centralisation is of a limited scope. As Beer writes,  
some part of any viable system does what it likes. But of course the autonomous 
part of the system remains part of the system, and to do that it must take notice of 
the central regulatory model. To that extent, then, it does what it is told. (1974: 71) 
Autonomy for Beer and cybernetics is not based on a ‘fanatical love of liberty’ 
(Bakunin, 1972 [1871]: 261) but on the practical needs of self-organising systems: 
it is an ‘effective freedom’ (Beer, 1975 [1973]). 
For anarchists, hierarchy is a target in so far as it acts to structure and reinforce 
domination and coercive control. Despite this apparent clash with anarchist 
principles, the way hierarchy appears in organisational cybernetics should not be 
seen as necessarily antithetical to the way anarchists view organisation. As 
McEwan writes (1987 [1963]: 44), ‘the usage [of the term “hierarchy”] is a 
technical one and does not coincide with the use of the term in anarchist 
criticisms of political organisation’. To show why this is the case, a distinction 
needs to be made between two forms of hierarchy: anatomical hierarchy and 
functional hierarchy. Like many important ideas, it is small, simple and elegant, 
and yet it makes a big difference when it comes to an anarchist cybernetic 
understanding of organisation. 
ephemera: theory & politics in organization  18.3: 427-456 
442 | article 
Functional hierarchy has its roots in Gordon Pask’s work on cybernetics. Pask 
writes of the social organisation of the firm: 
(I)magine a busy executive (who acts as an overall controller in the hierarchy) 
disturbed by m callers. Each hour, to achieve stability and get on with his work, he 
engages a receptionist (who acts as a sub controller) […] The receptionist […] is able 
to perform the selective operation of prevaricating with callers so that, for example, 
the one who is welcome each hour is accepted […] In a very real sense, which gives 
substance to the idea of a ‘level’, the interaction of sub controllers takes place in an 
object language (talking about callers), whilst the overall controller has a 
metalanguage (talking about receptionists). There can, of course, be any number 
of levels. (1968 [1961]: 61) 
While this is framed within a typically-hierarchical organisational structure with 
an executive and a receptionist, the point Pask is getting at is that the hierarchy is 
also one of levels of language: the highest level in the hierarchy involves a 
metalanguage that is used to talk about lower levels, which too have a language to 
talk about levels lower than them. Although this is clearly a hierarchy such that a 
level thrice removed from the top, for example, would have difficulty 
communicating directly with the top and vice versa given the difference in 
languages, Pask is very clear that this describes a logical hierarchy of orders, not 
one that is necessarily rooted in a physical or structural hierarchy (ibid.: 63). Beer 
argues similarly and goes so far as to describe hierarchy in systems and 
organisations as ‘a fiction, which may or may not be reified as an organisation or 
structure’ (1975: 130). The hierarchy Pask and other cyberneticians describe is 
one of higher and lower orders such that decisions, actions, events, meanings, 
etc. at lower levels are dependent on frameworks set by higher levels. It is a way 
of understanding different functions within a system or organisation and is not 
synonymous with any kind of actual structure. Of course, functions may (and 
often do) operate within a structure, but crucially they can be separated from 
structure in terms of the roles they play in organisation. 
Pask describes the implications of this account of hierarchy for self-organisation: 
each member must have the possibility, however small, of inverting the structure 
without leaving his niche to do so. I do not mean ‘the office boy can rise to be 
manager’. I mean, ‘in some unspecified conditions the office boy can take the 
managerial decisions’. (1968 [1961]: 111) 
Key here is the distinction between the manager as a position or office and 
managerial decisions as something anyone in the organisation can in theory take 
should the situation demand it. Within an organisation, then, two hierarchies 
operate: an anatomical one of positions (office boy, receptionist, manager, 
executive) and a functional one of roles or logical orders (office boy tasks and 
decisions, receptionist tasks and decisions, managerial tasks and decisions, 
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executive tasks and decisions). The two kinds of hierarchy are quite distinct from 
a cybernetic perspective. 
Anatomical hierarchy refers to what is traditionally understood as hierarchy in 
political or social organisation; i.e., multiple levels with a chain of command such 
that each level is subordinate to the levels above it and where the top level has 
overall control over decision making in the organisation. Functional hierarchy, 
however, applies to an organisation where ‘there are two or more levels of 
information structure operating in the system’ (McEwan, 1987 [1963]: 44). 
Functional hierarchy involves distinct orders of decision making such that higher 
order decisions are decisions about lower order decisions. As McEwan writes 
(ibid.), phrasing this in terms of a cybernetic understanding of an organisation 
operating in an environment, ‘some parts may deal directly with the 
environment, while other parts relate to activity of these first parts.’ 
Beer is similarly dismissive of the necessity of a hierarchical or centralised 
structure to how an organisation operates. In the section on the VSM above, I 
mentioned that Beer divides the model into two parts: one relating to the 
autonomous operation of Systems One and Two and the other relating to the 
strategic and regulatory functions of Systems Three, Four and Five. He express 
his distaste for referring to these two parts as ‘junior management’ and ‘senior 
management’ respectively because of the notion of hierarchy and command this 
connotes (1979: 130). He rejects the notion that the hierarchy in the VSM is 
‘equivalent to the political supposition that there must be policy bosses’. Instead, 
the hierarchical relationship between the parts of the VSM ‘is a logical 
relationship, whatever social form it is given’ (ibid., italics in original). What Beer 
means by ‘logical’ here is that the hierarchy of the VSM is a conceptual prop 
rather than a concrete, structural aspect of any existing organisations. McEwan 
makes this same point by distinguishing between two broad organisational 
functions: (a) ‘the complex of actual production tasks’; and (b) ‘the task of solving 
the problem of how the group should be organised to perform these first level 
tasks, and how information about them should be dealt with by the group’ (1987 
[1963]: 47). The crucial point to grasp in developing an anarchist cybernetics, and 
what marks it out as not only subscribing to a functional or logical hierarchy but 
to an explicit rejection or limiting of anatomical or structural hierarchy, is this: 
the different levels in the functional hierarchy all potentially involve the very 
same individual participants.  
The radical and potentially non- or less-hierarchical organisational form (less 
hierarchical, that is, than traditional forms of political organisation like political 
parties and trade unions), that is common to anarchist politics may adhere to a 
functional form of hierarchy such that certain decisions are considered to be 
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higher or lower order than others while there are no bodies or individuals that 
are structurally higher or lower than others. As these are functions or roles as 
opposed to positions, by switching role depending on the activity at hand, 
individuals can perform functionally hierarchical tasks while avoiding the 
institutionalisation of an anatomical hierarchy. This is the concrete promise of 
anarchist cybernetics and suggests how an understanding of anarchist 
organisation can be enhanced through an engagement with organisational 
cybernetics and Beer’s VSM. 
An anarchist Viable System Model 
It ought now to be possible to begin sketching an anarchist Viable System Model. 
The picture I want to present briefly here is drawn from accounts of the 
organisational structure of the Occupy camps that took place in public squares 
across the world in 2011, most notably in New York’s Zuccotti Park. Of course, 
each Occupy camp was different and the extent to which any of them reflected 
anarchist principles is debatable (e.g. Gibson, 2013; Graeber, 2011; Hammond, 
2015). The intention here, however, is not to argue that the Occupy camps were 
examples of anarchist cybernetic organisation but instead to take inspiration 
from some of their practices in describing a potential anarchist VSM. In doing 
so, the account here is informed by descriptions of Occupy by authors such as 
David Graeber (2011; 2013), Marianne Maeckelbergh (2012; 2014) and Mark Bray 
(2013) as well as by movement participants (e.g., Khatib, et al., 2012). 
Importantly, the way Occupy is described here is not intended to suggest that it 
was a perfect example of well-functioning radical left organisation. There are 
important critiques of various aspects of the practices involved in the Occupy 
movement (as the authors cited above discuss) and what is included here is 
meant as a framework or vocabulary for thinking about radical left and anarchist 
organisation and not a comment on the actually-existing Occupy camps.  
Neither is the proposal of an anarchist VSM below to be considered as a 
blueprint for anarchist organisation, something anarchists and other radicals 
have been frequently opposed to (e.g. Wilson, 2014: 36-42). As noted above, 
Beer’s original VSM itself was not intended as a blueprint but as a heuristic 
device aimed at helping people work through problems of organisational 
structure. The anarchist VSM, in so far as it aims to outline some necessary 
functions and lines of communication of radically participatory and democratic 
organisation, is similarly meant to help guide an understanding of anarchist 
organisation without prescribing the precise structure in question. How 
anarchist organisations look in reality differs greatly from case to case and the 
anarchist VSM does not suggest they all ought to look identical but rather that 
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they all ought to include certain functions and lines of communication, however 
these may be realised in practice. The comments below about Occupy, therefore, 
should be taken with this in mind, not as prescriptions but as examples of how 
an anarchist VSM could be used to think about organisational structure. 
Starting with the System One operational units, then, those parts of the 
organisation that are tasked with the tactical work of the organisation, these can 
be seen in the various formal and informal working groups and caucuses as well 
as in individual activists. These were involved in the day-to-day running of the 
camps (cleaning, cooking, etc.) as well as planning protests and demonstrations, 
liaising with the press, organising the camps’ own media and many other jobs. 
These were voluntary organisations and individual activists could be members of 
different groups. Following the logic of Beer’s VSM, System Two would focus on 
the coordination between these different working groups and would include 
informal communication (activists chatting over lunch) or more formal 
communications (in regular working group coordination meetings). System Two 
is not a structural part of the organisation of the camp but is a function of 
coordination between System One groups and activists.  
As discussed above, the VSM is divided into two sections: the lower part that 
deals with autonomous coordination and the higher part that deals with framing 
this autonomous action within the whole organisation. For the anarchist VSM, 
the higher section would be reflected in the general assemblies that took place 
regularly in the Occupy camps. System Three involves members of the 
organisation reflecting on the activities of the working groups in relation to the 
overall strategy of the organisation. Members of the working groups consider 
their activities and adjust them if necessary in line with the decided-upon goals of 
the organisation. Crucially, for an anarchist cybernetics, all activists can, 
potentially, be involved in the general assemblies and so in these System Three 
discussions. The same individuals step out of their functional role as working 
group members and individual activists and into that of reflecting on their 
practice within the autonomous groups. System Four involves the same 
individuals again, and also in the general assemblies, reflecting on their activities 
and those of the organisation as a whole in relation to events in the outside 
world. Adjustments to both tactics and strategy can be made in light of changes 
in the environment of which individual groups might not be aware but of which 
those present at the general assemblies can collectively inform each other.10  																																																								
10  There was, importantly, discussion in Occupy Wall Street around implementing an 
additional body, a spokescouncil, that would allow for better coordination between 
working groups. This would not alter the description of the anarchist VSM in any 
fundamental way, but would point towards System Three and Four functions being 
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The final level of the account of Occupy I’m presenting here is that which is 
concerned with the strategy and overall goals of the organisation. This is again a 
level of discussion and decision-making that is, or should be, open to all in the 
organisation. It is where decisions are made about the objectives and priorities of 
the organisation and is ultimately what limits the autonomy of the working 
groups; but again, this is not a limitation coming from a distinct group of leaders 
but is something that is agreed upon democratically by all members of the 
organisation (in practice through consensus or high-threshold majority vote). 
As discussed above, the essential distinction in the anarchist form of VSM here is 
that there is a hierarchy in terms of function or logic but not in terms of structure 
and it is not a hierarchy that issues commands from one group to another group. 
Rather, decisions are made democratically by all members of the organisation. 
Limits are imposed on their autonomy but these are limits that are agreed upon 
together. By making these crucial distinctions and by delving into the detail of 
how self-organisation operates according to Beer’s cybernetics, I have suggested 
here that we can better understand precisely how anarchist organisation might 
be better characterised. For anarchism, a prefigurative commitment to radical, 
participatory democracy is a key element of how organisation should work. 
Through cybernetics, and the at-first-sight-contradictory concept of functional 
hierarchy, I have tried to show how such a form of organisation, built around the 
necessity of participatory democratic control and the demand for autonomy can 
be thought through in detail.11 
As with the general discussion of Beer’s VSM, it is important here to consider 
the extent to which the anarchist VSM is descriptive and the extent to which it is 
normative. While Beer’s VSM, as I noted above, is intended as a purely 
descriptive heuristic tool, with the normativity coming from those using it, in the 
anarchist VSM the normativity is more central to the model itself. This is because 
instead of the anarchist VSM being proposed as a general account of the 																																																																																																																																																
performed in the spokescouncil meetings with delegates from lower order clusters 
rather than in general assemblies. I leave a more detailed discussion of this change to 
a future paper. 
11  An interesting and potentially important contribution to this account of control 
might be made by turning to the work of Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann (2012; 2013) 
objects to the possibility of external steering or control of systems found in some 
classic approaches to cybernetics, notwithstanding the focus in cybernetics on self-
organisation and self-steering. Luhmann argues that direct, top-down steering is 
impossible given the complexity of the world. While unpacking the possible 
implications of Luhmann’s work for this anarchist reading of cybernetics is beyond 
the scope of this paper, the way I have characterised self-organisation here and the 
notion of anarchist cybernetics more generally may benefit from future examination 
of Luhmann’s position on steering and indeed on systems and organisation overall. 
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functions and lines of communication in any system, it is specifically aimed at 
explaining the functions and lines of communication in cases of anarchist 
organisation. As indicated throughout this paper, this means that the model 
presupposes a normative commitment to resisting all forms of domination and 
exploitation and to a radically participatory form of democratic decision making. 
This key difference between Beer’s VSM and the anarchist VSM, therefore, 
comes down to the normative running side-by-side with the descriptive in the 
model. Rather than focussing purely on effective organisation (the descriptive 
element of the VSM) and leaving the ethical and political commitments (the 
normative) to those using the model, the anarchist VSM involves both effective 
organisation and ethical and political commitment as central drivers of the 
model. 
This meeting of anarchism and cybernetics is perhaps presented as being 
somewhat neater than a complete overview, more complete than I have been able 
to provide here, of the tradition of cybernetics might suggest. While, as I have 
highlighted, there are several points of contact where the understanding 
organisational cybernetics provides can help advance anarchist accounts of 
organisation, it should be noted that this is undoubtedly a partial reading of 
cybernetics and does not take into account the full range of complexity present in 
the field. It is perhaps no surprise that, with the potential exception of Walter, 
none of the cyberneticians discussed here were drawn to the participatory 
democratic practices of anarchism during their lifetimes. True, many were 
involved one way or another in radical experiments in art, robotics and 
computing (see Pickering, 2010), but on the whole their politics did not, explicitly 
at least, stretch beyond a social democracy infused at times with counter-cultural 
extravagance and spiritualism. At times, the politics of cybernetics spun in quite 
the opposite direction. Friedrich Hayek, for example, showed an interest in 
cybernetics in the 1950s and 60s (e.g. Hayek, 2013) and while he never developed 
this in his work, the notions of complexity and self-organising systems (self-
organising through competition rather than cooperation) did influence his 
account of the free market as a tool for allowing order to emerge from chaos 
(Cooper, 2011; see also Gilbert, 2005). However, rather than show a direct 
correlation between all elements of the cybernetics tradition, or indeed even all 
elements of Beer’s work, my aim here has been to point towards some specific 
insights into self-organisation found in cybernetics that, when elaborated in a 
certain way, with an attention to limiting authoritarian, top-down control, can be 
fruitfully brought into conversation with anarchist political theory and practice. 
Before concluding, I want to turn to a potential critique of this approach to 
understanding anarchist organisation that potentially calls into question the very 
foundations of the relationship between cybernetics and anarchism. 
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Responding to the CMS critique of cybernetics 
Much of the response to cybernetics in CMS has centred around rejecting it as a 
functionalist approach to social organisation. Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan 
(1979) define functionalism according to, firstly, a positivist ontological position 
that views reality as an objective phenomenon that can be accessed directly 
through detached, scientific observation and, secondly, a commitment to ‘social 
engineering as a basis of social change’. ‘It is concerned,’ they write, ‘with the 
effective “regulation” and control of social affairs’ based on maintaining an 
equilibrium or status quo (ibid.: 25-26). The critique of cybernetics in the CMS 
literature focuses on the perceived goal of designing organisational structures 
according to an objectively true model of how organisations achieve stability and 
meet set aims. As Hugh Willmott argues, cybernetics is as a ‘comparatively 
sophisticated example of knowledge guided by a technical interest in prediction 
and control’ (1997: 323). This critique is raised outside CMS by Werner Ulrich 
(1981) who, in reflecting on Beer’s economic planning work in Chile with Project 
Cybersyn (Medina, 2011), highlights the way in which a group of technicians was 
able to design a communications network that reduced the scope of agency in 
decision making for workers in factories and managed their activities through 
commands that came from a centralised control room. ‘As an action system’, he 
stresses, ‘Cyberstride [the Project Cybersyn computer programme] can impose its 
autonomy on the allegedly autonomous decision makers’ (ibid.: 52).12 
Ulrich goes so far as to describe this approach to knowledge and control as 
‘managerial fascism’ (ibid.: 55, following Ivan Illich) and Andrew Pickering writes 
of how it conjures up ‘the spectre of Big Brother’ (2010: 31). To the extent that 
cybernetics can be put to work in an account of anarchist organisation, then, the 
critique of it as functionalist seems to throw up a serious obstacle. It could well 
be argued that the anarchist VSM is a prime example of an attempt by someone 
with (the pretension of) expert knowledge to define a model of organisational 
structure that should be applied by activists if they want to be successful in 
achieving their aims. 
On the two constituent parts of the CMS critique of cybernetics as functionalist, a 
response from within cybernetics can be attempted. Rather than being founded 
on a positivist view of reality and scientific observation, the second-order 
cybernetics of Beer, Pask and others (see Scott, 2004) has, according to 
Pickering, more in common with social constructionism and ‘a vision of 
knowledge as part of performance rather than as an external control of it’ (2000: 																																																								
12  For similar critiques, see Medina (2011: 191-192), Kline (2015: 241), Tiqqun (2010) 
and The Invisible Committee (2014). 
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25, italics in original). If knowledge is socially constructed and based on 
subjective interpretation rather than objective observation, and is an active part of 
doing rather than simply of knowing in a detached way, then the charge of social 
engineering too has to be reconsidered. Firstly, the knowledge involved in this 
strand of cybernetics is a knowledge accessible to and held by participants in a 
certain practice rather than external observers. Secondly, the application of this 
knowledge is not from the outside and top-down but from within and bottom-up: 
the participants in a practice apply the knowledge themselves in deciding how to 
act. This is not to say that that knowledge and the process of performance can 
never be captured by centralised, top-down structures and processes, but it does 
reject the assumption that such a centralisation of top-down command is 
necessarily a part of how cybernetics understands organisation. For cybernetician 
Ernst von Glasersfeld (1991), this ‘radical constructivist’ approach to cybernetics 
is less about the top-down control that anarchists are opposed to and more about 
helping people navigate experiences, practices and relationships. 
How then should the anarchist VSM be understood as something applied not by 
external, detached technicians of social engineering but in a radically democratic 
and participatory process of socially constructed knowledge used by participants 
of organisational practices? The key here is to take seriously Beer’s description of 
the VSM as a ‘diagnostic tool’. The VSM, as the discussion above pointed out, is 
not to be considered a blueprint for organisation but should instead be thought 
of as a guide for identifying important roles, functions and lines of 
communication. Beer’s contention is that however an organisation looks to its 
members, it will, if it is to be effective in responding to complexity, involve the 
functions identified in the VSM. Highlighting these functions may allow those 
inside the organisation to point out where breakdowns in communication or 
threats to decentralisation, for example, happen and the effect they have on the 
organisation. The VSM helps explain this and can be used in responding to 
problems within the organisation, but it does not necessarily dictate how the 
organisation should be structured. This, however, raises a further question. If the 
VSM is not a model of organisational structure, what is specifically anarchist 
about anarchist cybernetics? Why is it not just an application of cybernetics to 
anarchist organisation that operates in the same way as its application to any 
other kind of organisation? 
While cybernetics underlines the benefit of decentralisation and functional 
hierarchy in terms of effectiveness in responding to complexity, something 
anarchist such as Kropotkin prefigured, anarchism adds to this the political or 
normative importance of decentralisation. For anarchists, decentralisation is not 
only praised because of its effectiveness but also, perhaps more importantly, 
because how it supports the political principle of individual and group autonomy 
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and freedom. Duda (2013: 64) describes the cybernetic approach to anarchism of 
McEwan as ‘a shift away from a moral vision of anarchism, outraged at the 
scandal of domination’ towards a paradigm focussed on the ‘superior 
productivity of anarchist organisational methodology’, but I would suggest that it 
in fact tries to show that anarchism trumps top-down government on both 
counts, without prioritising one over the other. This crucial element of anarchist 
cybernetics additionally helps in articulating a non-functionalist approach to 
cybernetics. While the functionalism critique holds that cybernetics is essentially 
focused on top-down social engineering, an anarchist cybernetics, with its 
commitment to decentralisation and self-organisation as radically democratic 
principles, rejects such an authoritarian imposition. Instead, the insights gained 
from an application of an anarchist VSM to a particular organisation would be 
acted on in a democratic and participatory way. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to propose an anarchist cybernetics, as a way 
of answering the question, ‘What can cybernetics teach us about how anarchists 
can and do organise?’. Cybernetics, specifically the work of Beer on the Viable 
Systems Model (VSM), details an approach to organisation that involves concepts 
of autonomy and self-organisation. For this reason, it was attractive to anarchists 
in the 1960s and 1970s. These germs of an anarchist engagement with 
cybernetics were, however, never developed and up until recently there has been 
little discussion of the connections. A return to these initial anarchist 
engagements with cybernetics suggests that bringing it into debates around 
alternative and radical organisation can be fruitful. Critical to such an attempt 
should be a development of the idea of functional hierarchy, introduced by 
cyberneticians such as Pask and Beer and made explicit in relation to anarchism 
by McEwan. The anarchist cybernetics and the alternative version of the VSM 
presented here are intended as the first steps in doing just that. By articulating 
the hierarchy in the VSM as a functional hierarchy of roles and tasks, 
organisational cybernetics has something to offer anarchist theory and practice in 
terms of a way to better understand the dynamics of non- or less-hierarchical 
organisation. This contributes to emerging work in anarchist studies that 
recognises the limits of anarchism (Wilson, 2014) and focusses less on the 
rejection of hierarchy in all its forms and more on an opposition to domination 
as a core aspect of anarchist politics (Prichard and Kinna, 2016). 
This is not to say that there are not a range of problems that need to be brought 
into any further conversations around anarchist cybernetics. Some of the central 
ideas discussed here, such as hierarchy and autonomy, may well be far more 
Thomas Swann Towards an anarchist cybernetics 
article  | 451 
complex than their treatment here may suggest (e.g., Böhm et al., 2010; 
Bookchin, 1995; Freeman, 1972; Wilson, 2014). Work in anarchist studies and 
CMS, as well as reflections from social movement participants, that 
problematises some of the foundational elements of anarchist and radical left 
organising needs to be addressed. More importantly perhaps, it remains to be 
seen how anarchist cybernetics might operate in activist contexts. Central to this 
would need to be an appreciation of intersecting oppressions and exploitations 
such as those that are constitutive of and target class, race, gender and sexuality, 
and the resistances to them that were a central part of the Occupy example I drew 
on here. Overall, however, an engagement between anarchism and cybernetics 
may have the potential to advance understandings of key aspects of the 
organisational dynamics of anarchist and radical left social movement 
organisation, as well as provide a contribution to anarchist and radical social 
movement praxis. 
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